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for monetary theorists and economic historians for well over a century. The puz-
zles associated with this period take various forms. Despite calculations of high 
proﬁ  t rates on note issue for certain periods of the era, national banks never fully 
utilized their note-issuing powers. Relatedly, the behavior of interest rates during 
the period is also puzzling given the regime of bank note issuance put in place 
by the National Bank Acts. On the surface, it appears that an arbitrage condition 
is broken. The observed inelasticity in aggregate national bank note issue also is 
puzzling, particularly given the behavior of interest rates. This paper examines 
many of the puzzles of the national banking era and provides a summary of the 
current attempts to explain those puzzles.
This paper represents a preliminary chapter from a forthcoming monograph on 
the period of the National Banking System. Other chapters of the monograph 
will appear in the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s working paper series.
Key words: bank notes, interest rates, National Banking System, national banks.
JEL code: E42, E43, G21, N21
Bruce Champ is an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. He can 
be reached at bruce.a.champ@clev.frb.orgIntroduction
This monograph would not be complete it if did not take a detailed look at what has
often been referred to as the “national bank note puzzle.” In fact, the national bank
era is marked by several odd features. The period has perplexed monetary historians
and theorists for around a century. In fact, Spurgeon Bell was the ﬁrst to clearly
state the puzzling nature of national bank behavior in an important 1912 article, in
which he investigated the proﬁtability of issuing national bank notes. On the surface,
the system seems simple and appears to have some obvious implications regarding
the behavior of interest rates and note issue during the period. However, we will see
in this paper that these implications are not borne out by the behavior of the data.
Despite more than a century of research, several aspects of the puzzles still remain,
although progress has been made in recent years.
1 The Puzzle Deﬁned
Recall that national banks could issue notes fully backed by U.S. government bonds. If
we look at the data, we ﬁnd that national banks never fully utilized their note-issuing
powers. If banks had fully done so, then they would have completely intermediated
the bonds that were eligible as backing. As we in see in Figure 1, they never did so.
In fact, for the period prior to 1900, banks only held 20–30% of the bonds eligible
as backing for national bank notes. If banks had fully intermediated the bonds, then
the percentage should have been close to 100% throughout the period.1 I will refer
to this phenomenon as the “underissuance of national bank notes.”
Underissuance of national bank notes appears paradoxical since, by previous cal-
1Some ﬁnancial intermediaries other than national banks were legally required to hold U.S. gov-
ernment securities. Also, national banks were required to hold U.S. government bonds as collateral
for U.S. government deposits. For these reasons, it is unreasonable to believe that national banks
would have held all the eligible securities as backing for notes.
2Figure 1: Percentage of U.S. Government Bonds Held as Backing for Na-












1915 1910 1905 1900 1895 1890 1885 1880 1875 1870
Source: Commercial and Financial Chronicle (various years).
culations, issuance of these notes was a relatively proﬁtable enterprise for national
banks.
1.1 Cagan’s proﬁt rate on national bank note issuance
In two papers written during the 1960s, Phillip Cagan presented a formula which
purports to measure the proﬁt rate on the issuance of national bank notes.2 This




p−αmin(p,1) if p > αmin(p,1)
∞ if p = αmin(p,1)
, (1)
2See Cagan (1963, 1965).
3where
rc = Cagan’s annual rate of return on the issuance of national bank notes
p = price of the bond held in backing, in dollars (assuming a par value of $1)
rb = annualized yield to maturity on the bond held as backing
α = fraction of the value of a given deposit of bonds that could be issued as notes
τ = annual expense in dollars of issuing αmin(p,1) in notes
Note that αmin(p,1) denotes the amount of notes that are returned to the issuing
bank by the U.S. Treasury from the deposit of an eligible bond with price p. The
variable τ denotes the annual cost of issuing notes. It consists of the tax on note
issue (for $1 in notes this is $0.01 before 1900 and $0.005 on 2% coupon rate bonds
after 1900) as well as miscellaneous costs of note issue.3 Cagan uses an estimate
provided by the Comptroller of the Currency for the miscellaneous costs of note issue
of 0.00625 for a one-dollar deposit in government bonds.4 Translating these costs to




α for bonds with a 1% tax on circulation
0.005 + 0.00625
α for bonds with a 1
2% tax on circulation (for 2% bonds after 1900)
(2)
Also note that for most of the the period, eligible bonds sold above par so that
αmin(p,1) = α.
The numerator of Cagan’s formula (equation 1) represents the dollar return from
the bond held as backing less the total costs associated with note issue. The denom-
inator represents the amount of capital tied up in the process of intermediating the
bond into national bank notes. The amount of capital tied up is the diﬀerence between
3The miscellaneous costs of note issue include the costs of redeeming national bank notes as well
as the cost of the plates used to print notes.
4Comptrollers often used a value of $62.50 for the costs associated with issuing the amount of
notes a $100,000 bond purchase would allow. The $62.50 ﬁgure was broken down into the following
components: cost of redemption, $45; express charges, $3; plates, $7.50; and agents’ fees, $7.
4the price of the bond and the amount of notes received from the U.S. Treasury.5
As an example, suppose that a bank in 1890 (implying that α = 0.9) purchased a
government bond for $1.10. This bond had a yield to maturity of 4 percent. In this
case, the total cost of note issue is τ = 0.01+ 0.00625
0.09 ≈ 0.01694. This implies that the





Cagan (1963) calculates annual rates of return on note issue and ﬁnds proﬁt rates
between 4.8% and 10.5% from 1879–97. Goodhart (1965), using Cagan’s formula,
calculates proﬁt rates of 18% to inﬁnity during the period 1901 to 1913. Cagan and
Schwartz (1991) calculate proﬁt rates from 16% in 1901 to inﬁnity in 1913. An inﬁnite
proﬁt rate could only occur in Cagan’s formula after 1900 (when α = 1) and when
the backing bond sold below par. In such a case, the amount of notes returned to the
issuing bank would be exactly equal to the price paid for the backing bond, implying
that the amount of tied-up capital would be zero. Presumably, the bank could earn
inﬁnite proﬁts by using the acquired notes to purchase additional government bonds
ad inﬁnitum.6
Most certainly, the implied proﬁt rates are, at times, far in excess of rates of
return on alternative uses of bank capital. Figure 2 shows my calculations of the
proﬁt rates on issuing national bank notes using the formula suggested by Cagan.
This data portrayed in this ﬁgure uses more accurate representations of the costs of
note issue than those estimated by the Comptroller of the Currency. Rather than
5Bell (1912) originally suggested this was the appropriate measure of capital tied up in the
intermediation of eligible bonds.
6Kuhlwein (1992) criticizes this view by claiming that dealers in government bonds may not have
always accepted national bank notes in payment.
5Figure 2: Cagan’s Proﬁt Rate on National Bank Note Issuance, 1878–1913
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Source: Author’s calculations using Cagan’s proﬁt rate formula, equation 1. The bond price data
comes from various issues of the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. The costs of note issue were
compiled from data presented in the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury.
being constant as in Cagan’s original formulation, the cost of note issue estimates
presented here vary over time. Note the gaps in the graph. These gaps correspond
to inﬁnite proﬁt rates as measured by Cagan’s formula. All of these instances occur
when the prices of 2% coupon bonds fell below par.
On the surface, proﬁt rates far in excess of alternative uses of bank capital are
puzzling. One would have expected banks to pursue the relatively more proﬁtable
enterprise of issuing notes. To do so would require the purchase of eligible bonds,
which, in turn, would put upward pressure on bond prices. This would cause the
return on note issue to fall. One would assume that this process would continue until
the return on note issue would be brought in line with that on alternative uses of
6bank capital, adjusted for risk.
The fact that that national banks did not fully exploit their note-issuing powers in
the face of apparently high proﬁtability of pursuing this enterprise is the main puzzle
of the national banking era. As Cagan notes, “It is nevertheless puzzling, why, in
view of the large proﬁt in issuing notes after the mid- 1890s, their expansion occurred
so slowly and never reached 100 percent of the amount allowed.” (Cagan 1965, p. 94)
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) also note the puzzling nature of national bank note
issuance when they state, “The fraction of the maximum issued ﬂuctuated with the
proﬁtability of issue, but the fraction was throughout lower than might have been
expected. We have no explanation for this puzzle.” (Friedman and Schwartz 1963,
p. 23) Friedman and Schwartz go on to state, “Either bankers did not recognize a
proﬁtable course of action simply because the net return was expressed as a percentage
of the wrong base, which is hard to accept, or we have overlooked some costs of bank
note issue that appeared large to them, which seems much more probable.” (Friedman
and Schwartz 1963, p. 24) When Friedman and Schwartz mention that “the net return
was expressed as a percentage of the wrong base,” they are referring to calculations
performed by contemporary Comptrollers of the Currency, who found low proﬁtability
of note issue during the era. The Comptrollers’ calculations are discussed in the next
section.
Cagan’s ﬁndings of high proﬁt rates would have surprised Secretary of the Treasury
Carlisle who summarized the prevailing views of the Comptroller and the Treasury
concerning bank note proﬁtability when he stated before the House Committee on
Banking and Currency in December 1894, “It is well known, of course, that the proﬁts
of the circulation of a national bank constitute a very small item of the total proﬁts of
the institution.” Certainly, one component of the solution to the national bank note
puzzle is to reconcile the contemporary view that note issue was not very proﬁtable
7with Cagan’s ﬁndings of high proﬁtability.
1.2 Deriving measures of the proﬁtability of note issue
To better understand Cagan’s proﬁt rate formula and to clarify some of the issues
surrounding it, let’s look in detail at a bank’s decision to issue additional notes. To
do so, it is useful to look at a simpliﬁed version of a typical national bank’s balance
sheet. This is depicted in Table 1, where only the items most relevant to a bank’s
decision to issue notes are presented.
Table 1: Balance Sheet of a Note-Issuing National Bank
Assets Liabilities
Reserves Bank notes in circulation (N)
Eligible bonds (B) Deposits
Other earning assets (A) Net worth
Paid-in capital )(K)
Surplus (S)
Consider the purchase of a government bond with price p and par value 1. Let’s
look at the eﬀect of this on the bank’s balance sheet. Here, ∆B = p. These bonds are
deposited with the U.S. Treasury and notes are returned to the bank. The amount of
notes returned is αmin(p,1), so that ∆N = αmin(p,1). The diﬀerence between the
bonds purchased and the notes received in return from the Treasury is ∆B − ∆N =
p − αmin(p,1). This amount is either positive or zero depending on p and α. When
this diﬀerence is positive, the bank must ﬁnance the diﬀerence by a decline in other
assets, reserves, or an increase in bank capital. For now, suppose the diﬀerence is
ﬁnanced by a reduction in other assets. In that case, ∆A = ∆N − ∆B.
There are a number of eﬀects of this action on bank proﬁts. First, there is interest
income on the bonds held as backing. If the annual yield on the bond is rb, the total
8interest income will be rbp. However, the decrease in other earning assets causes a
decline in revenue. If ra is the annual yield on other assets, the decreased revenue
from the decline in earning assets is ra[p−αmin(p,1)]. Furthermore, the bank incurs
costs of issuing notes. This amount will be τ∆N = ταmin(p,1), assuming the costs
are proportional to the amount of notes issued. Adding all this up implies a change
in proﬁts (∆π) of
∆π = Interest income on bonds held
− Interest foregone due to decline in assets
− Costs associated with note issue
= rbp − ra[p − αmin(p,1)] − ταmin(p,1). (3)
1.2.1 Proﬁt calculations by the Comptroller of the Currency
In the late 1800s, various Comptrollers of the Currency made estimates of the prof-
itability of issuing notes. They performed these calculations to argue that national
banks were not making large proﬁts oﬀ the issuance of notes.7 The comptrollers
presented calculations of ∆π/p, which they labeled the “proﬁt in circulation in ex-
cess of 6 percent on the investment.” For ra, they used 6% (hence the label). The
comptrollers found values for this typically between 0.4 and 1.3 percent.8 Because of
these low values, they concluded that note issuance was not very proﬁtable.
Cagan (1965) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963) provide a criticism of the Comp-
trollers’ measurements, asserting that p is not the proper amount of bank capital tied
7Contemporary critics of the National Banking System claimed that national banks made “double
proﬁts” from the interest earned on U.S. government securities held as backing for bank notes and
from interest earned when the notes were lent out to borrowers. Comptrollers of the era frequently
countered such claims by presenting proﬁt rate calculations in their annual reports.
8The Comptroller’s estimates ranged from −0.5 to 3.8 percent, but the majority of the estimates
were in the bounds stated in the text.
9up in the issuance of notes. Their view is that instead of ∆B −∆N = p−αmin(p,1)
being ﬁnanced by reductions in assets, it was ﬁnanced by an injection of capital. As
we have seen, Cagan measures the proﬁt rate as the return on eligible bonds less the
cost of note issue as a percentage of the amount of capital tied up (equation 1).
1.2.2 Accounting for idle notes
Champ, Wallace, and Weber (1992) present an important criticism of earlier proﬁt
rate calculations. The proﬁtability calculations presented earlier in this paper (equa-
tions 1 and 3) assume that all notes were constantly in circulation, an assumption
that is counterfactual. Implicitly the assumption is that since the notes were used
to buy interest-bearing assets (such as making loans), they were always earning the
bank the rate of return ra. However, idle notes did not earn this rate of return. They
earned nothing.
Notes were idle either when they were sitting in the vaults of the issuing bank
or when they had been redeemed and were en route from the Treasury back to the
issuing bank. The amounts of these idle notes were not trivial as seen in Figure 3.
During the late 1880s and early 1890s, idle notes amounted to around 40% of the
national bank notes outstanding.
If we account for idle notes, we must alter our calculation of the eﬀect of issuing
notes on proﬁts. Suppose that, on average, a bank expects that the fraction φ of notes
outstanding will be in circulation at any point in time. Then the diﬀerence between
bonds purchased and notes in circulation is no longer ∆B −∆N, but is ∆B −φ∆N.
Alternatively, this amount is p − φαmin(p,1). Multiplying this by the rate of return
on assets gives us the amount of interest foregone due to the decline in other earning
assets. Furthermore, the tax and other miscellaneous costs were only levied on notes
in circulation so that the total eﬀect on proﬁts due to the cost of note issue should
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now be τφαmin(p,1). So we should amend our calculation of the eﬀect on proﬁts to
be
∆π
∗ = rbp − ra[p − φαmin(p,1)] − τφαmin(p,1). (4)
One the one hand, idle notes reduce proﬁts by not earning the rate of return on
assets, ra. However, idle notes lower the cost of note issue since idle notes are not
taxed; the semiannual tax on note issue only applied to notes in circulation. If we
compare this equation with our previous measure of the eﬀect on proﬁts, we can see
the eﬀect that φ has on proﬁts.
11∆π
∗ − ∆π = (ra − τ)(φ − 1)αmin(p,1). (5)
Since rA > τ, then idle notes (φ < 1) imply that proﬁts will be lower than when there
are no idle notes. In other words, idle notes reduce the proﬁtability of note issue.
1.2.3 Calculating a rate of return on equity
National banks were required by law to purchase a minimum amount of government
bonds that was based on the amount of bank paid-in capital. A bank’s total capital
consisted of two elements—paid-in capital and surplus. Paid-in capital was that
amount of a bank’s subscribed capital that had actually been paid into the bank.
Surplus was the accumulation of past retained earnings.
The requirement was that banks had to hold bonds equal to β = 1/4 of their
paid-in capital, so that the minimum amount of bond holdings was βK. The law
was a bit more complicated than that in reality, but this is what we will use for our
computations. The maximum amount of note issue was based on the bank’s capital.
So, for a bank issuing with a paid-in capital of K, the total change in proﬁts arising

















Champ, Wallace, and Weber felt that the Comptroller’s choice of ra = 0.06 was
a bit too high. For ra, they used the bond held as backing with the highest yield
to maturity. They also believed that the Comptroller’s estimates of costs were too
high. These costs should only include marginal costs in the calculation. Costs like
plates (basically a one-time expense), which were included in the Comptroller’s cost
12estimates should not be included. So, instead of using the Comptroller’s estimate of
τ = 0.01 + 0.00625






α for bonds with a 1% tax on circulation
0.005 + 0.005
α for bonds with a 1/2% tax on circulation (2% bonds after 1900)
(7)
Calculating ∆πE, Champ, Wallace, and Weber obtain a median value of $1,910 and
conclude that this is not a large addition to proﬁts.
To get a better handle on the magnitude, they calculate the value of ∆πE relative
to the size of bank net worth. This gives us a measure of the rate of return to equity,
a more meaningful ﬁgure. Dividing ∆πE by total capital to obtain the change in the













When those calculate ∆rE, they get quite small estimates. The median estimate
is around 0.5%. This does not seem to be a large value since they ignore some of the
costs of note issue.
1.3 The national bank note puzzle restated
Another way to look at the national bank note puzzle is from an interest rate or
bond price perspective. Cagan and Schwartz (1991) note that the national bank note
puzzle can be interpreted in such a manner—in particular with respect to the prices
on U.S. government securities that were eligible as backing for national bank notes.
They speciﬁcally ask the question: Why was the the price of eligible collateral so low?
13Cagan and Schwartz state, “The real puzzle, we show, is why the market prices of
some of the eligible bonds did not reﬂect their value for securing note issues.” (Cagan
and Schwartz 1991, p. 293) Stated diﬀerently, why was the yield on eligible collateral
so high during this period?
Essentially, banks during this period could borrow from the federal government
at the tax rate on circulation (1% before 1900 and, eﬀectively, 1/2% thereafter) and
receive notes from the U.S. Treasury. These notes could be used to purchase assets
of various types. We would expect national banks to have exploited any interest
rate spread between the tax rate and interest-bearing assets until the spreads were
eliminated after accounting for risk. This implies that we should expect the yields
on government bonds and safe short-tem assets to be driven down to the tax rate on
note issue.
There are times, typically in the fall, that short-term interest rates on call loans
in New York exceeded 25%. It is puzzling that, during such times, national banks did
not choose to expand their circulation in the form of loans in these markets. However,
as noted earlier, there is very little, if any, seasonal variation in note issue by national
banks, at least before 1907. On the surface, it appears that an arbitrage condition is
being broken.
Yelds on government bonds far exceeded the tax rate on note issue. Figure 4 illus-
trates the yields on several classes of bonds that were important components of bank
holdings of eligible securities for backing national bank notes. Recall that the tax
rate on note issue was one percent before 1900 and, eﬀectively, 0.5 percent after 1900.
This implies that the yields on eligible securities exceeded the tax rate by 100 to 200
basis points throughout the period. It would seem that a national bank, set up purely
as a means to intermediate government bonds, could have exploited this diﬀerential
to make proﬁts. One would have expected such a system of competitive banks to
14Figure 4: Yields on Selected Eligible U.S. Government Securities, 1882–













Source: Commercial and Financial Chronicle (various years).
have driven the interest rate on government bonds down to the cost of performing
such an intermediation (the tax rate on note issue). What are we missing? Cagan
and Schwartz claim that “national banks did not pursue rational proﬁt maximiza-
tion.” (Cagan and Schwartz 1991, p. 306) However, several studies have provided
alternative explanations of the national bank note puzzle. Nonetheless, it is safe to
say that no one explanation has received universal acceptance.
2 Possible Explanations for the National Bank Note
Puzzle
The observed calculations of high proﬁt rates of issuing national bank notes in the
face of low issuance of notes is puzzling. We have seen that we can also state the
15national bank note puzzle as one involving a perplexing spread between the tax rate
on note issue and the yields of eligible bonds. Over the decades, several potential
explanations for this puzzle have been provided.
2.1 Risks associated with national bank note issue
One area of research that attempts to explain the national bank note puzzle focuses
on risks associated with note issue. Proﬁt rate calculations ignore any impact of
risk associated with note issue. Studies that pursue this route for an explanation
have focused on risks associated with a Congressional termination of the circulation
privilege for national banks and on the riskiness of the eligible collateral for national
bank notes.
2.1.1 Risk of revocation of the circulation privilege
Goodhart (1965) emphasizes that Cagan’s proﬁt formula does not take into account
certain elements of risk or all of the redemption costs associated with bank note
issuance. Goodhart begins by noting that national banks were uncertain regarding
a continuation of the system in which they operated and that this has implications
regarding Cagan’s formula. As Goodhart states,
...the proﬁt formula of Cagan assumed that the legal arrangements controlling the
issue of banknotes were, and were expected to remain, permanent. But there was
always a probability, and after 1907 a probability, that the circulation privilege would
be terminated. (Goodhart 1965, p. 94)
In this view, the fact that certain classes of U.S. government securities could
be used as backing for national bank notes might have resulted in them having a
premium over other classes of bonds. Goodhart argues that if Congress were to have
terminated the right of national banks to issue notes, the prices of the bonds used as
16backing would have fallen. This risk must have been perceived by national banks but
is not taken into account by Cagan’s formula.
However, it should be noted that after 1907, when opposition to the National
Banking System appears to have become strongest, the proportion of national bank
notes outstanding to the legal maximum was at its highest levels. To resolve the para-
dox that note issue was relatively high during a period in which note issue appeared
to be most risky due to the possibility of a termination of the circulation privilege,
Goodhart refers to diﬀering behavior between city banks and country banks.
He observes that while central reserve city banks reduced their circulation of notes
from $82.4 million in 1908 to $78.3 million in 1913, reserve city and country banks
actually increased their note issue from $531.3 million to $646.1 million over the
same period. Thus, the net result was an increase in total notes outstanding by
$110.7 million over the period. Goodhart suggests that relatively lower costs of bank
note issuance for country banks caused this disparity in behavior.
The reasons for Goodhart’s diﬀerential cost argument lie in the procedure for
redeeming national bank notes. If a particular bank found itself holding the notes
of other banks and the public was not willing to absorb these so-called “redundant
notes,” the bank holding them could redeem the notes by sending them to the U.S.
Treasury (before 1874 notes were redeemed through reserve agent banks).9 The Trea-
sury then would send lawful money (e.g., greenbacks) to the redeeming bank. If neces-
sary, the issuing bank would then be required to replenish its redemption fund, which
was to be maintained at ﬁve percent of the value of a bank’s outstanding circulation.
The Treasury would then return the bank notes to the issuing bank.
9The reason that national banks were reluctant to hold these redundant notes is that they did
not satisfy legal reserve requirements. Only “lawful money” satisﬁed such requirements.
17However, this redemption procedure was not without cost. As Spurgeon Bell, who
introduced many of the arguments extended by Goodhart, wrote, “The redeeming
bank must forego the use of funds in transit during the week or two weeks elapsing
between the time of shipping and the time of receiving the redemption money.”10 The
redeeming bank was also required to absorb the shipping charges to the Treasury.
However, an alternative to redeeming redundant notes existed for the country
banks. Country banks could deposit these notes with a correspondent bank in a
reserve city where the deposit would typically earn two percent interest.11 Reserve
city banks could, in turn, send the notes to a central reserve city bank and also earn
interest on the deposit. The end result was an accumulation of redundant national
bank notes in the central reserve city bank vaults. As Goodhart points out, the viable
alternatives facing a central reserve city bank were to redeem the redundant notes,
which was costly, or reduce (or at least not further expand) their own circulation in
the hope that the notes would be absorbed by the public.12 Due to the costly nature
of redeeming bank notes, Goodhart suggests that central reserve city banks chose the
latter option; hence, the diﬀering behavior of note issue referred to above.
However, central reserve city banks also chose to redeem national bank notes, as
did other banks. Figure 5 portrays the percentage of outstanding national bank notes
that were redeemed in each year from 1875 to 1913. Annual bank note redemptions
typically amounted to around 50% of the volume of notes outstanding, and about half
of these notes were sent by large banks in New York City. Goodhart argues that the
10See Bell (1912, p. 45). Given the current state of technology (e.g., electronic funds transfers),
it is easy to forget the signiﬁcance role played by time spent in transit during the period of the
National Banking System.
11The two percent interest paid on such bankers’ balances was remarkably constant over the period
of the National Banking System.
12Goodhart actually refers to four alternatives open to banks. However, the two mentioned here
appear to be the most reasonable alternatives. For a further discussion see Goodhart (1965, pp. 521–
22).
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bulk of the redemption costs were borne by central reserve city banks. If this were
the case, there must have been some incentive for central reserve city banks to attract
notes to their vaults. Otherwise it is diﬃcult to understand why central reserve banks
paid two percent interest on deposits from banks which used them as correspondents,
an action which undoubtedly did indeed attract redundant notes. It is also diﬃcult
to believe that the cost of redeeming national bank notes was that high for national
banks located in central reserve cities. U.S. Treasury note redemption centers existed
in those cities, so the two week period of time to redeem notes referred to by Bell seems
unrealistic for central reserve banks.13 In addition, if the city banks rid themselves of
redundant notes in an indirect manner by reducing their own circulation, as Goodhart
13James (1976) also presents an argument that the costs could not have been very large for a
redeeming bank. See Section 2.2 for more detail.
19suggests they did from 1908 to 1913, this action required sending lawful money to
Washington and waiting for the return of the bonds held as backing. This procedure
would have been just as costly as redeeming the redundant notes in the ﬁrst place.
Given the consequences, it is diﬃcult to understand why city banks attracted the
notes in the ﬁrst place. Thus, it is unclear whether Goodhart’s diﬀerential cost
argument explains the diﬀering behavior between city and country banks during this
period.
In any case, it would appear that Goodhart’s diﬀerential cost argument sidetracked
him from the main issue. Only those costs which aﬀected the proﬁtability of note
issue should be considered in explaining bank note underissuance. The redemption
costs referred to by Goodhart had little relation to a bank’s decision whether to issue
additional notes. However, certain costs associated with the redemption procedure
were borne by the issuing bank. These costs and their implications are detailed in the
following section. A part of these costs which aﬀected note proﬁtability were ignored
in Cagan’s proﬁt calculations.
Champ (1990) extends the Bell-Goodhart analysis associated with the risk of a
termination of the circulation privilege by Congress. Champ concludes that after
examining the prevailing attitudes toward the National Banking System, it becomes
apparent that national banks must have been uncertain regarding a continuation of
the system throughout the period, not just after 1907. National banks would have
been naive to believe that the circulation privilege could not be revoked. Further, the
existence of a positive probability that this privilege would be revoked has important
implications for the issuance of national bank notes. In A History of Currency in
the United States, A. Barton Hepburn summarizes the problems facing the National
Banking System when he states
20The national banking system, designed, as we have seen, to give the people a permanent
paper currency, lacked the necessary support even in the ranks of those who had created
it. Only by the most strenuous eﬀorts was the system able to survive the political
attacks upon the one hand and the untoward conditions of a decreasing volume and
enhancing prices of bonds, producing diminution of proﬁts, on the other. (Hepburn
1915, p. 338)
Champ (1990) documents Congressional opposition to the National Banking Sys-
tem and provides estimates of the potential capital losses that national banks might
incur had the circulation privilege been revoked. These potential capital losses were
not small and could have played a role in the low issuance of bank notes by national
banks. These concerns were captured in legislation that replaced the National Bank
Acts. Instead of completely eliminating note issuance by national banks, issuance
was allowed until the eligible bonds were fully eliminated. The helped to minimize
any capital losses that banks might incur in the transition process.
2.1.2 Risky collateral
When banks encountered changes in the demand for national bank notes, they may
have desired to adjust the amount of notes outstanding and their holdings of U.S. gov-
ernment securities held as backing. Although banks could costlessly store idle notes in
their vaults, they may have wished to routinely alter their holdings of U.S. government
securities held as backing for notes. More proﬁtable alternatives to holding U.S. gov-
ernment bonds may have existed. This means that banks may have been concerned
with ﬂuctuations in the prices of eligible bonds. Champ (1990) and Kuhlwein (1992)
examine risk features of the bonds that national banks held as backing for national
bank notes.
Since banks could only intermediate long-term U. S. bonds implies that banks had
to deal with a fair amount of market risk in issuing notes. As Spurgeon Bell stated
in 1912,
21The name of a government bond carries with it, for the great majority, the idea of secu-
rity; but the large bankers who are familiar with the ﬁscal operations of the government
and are accustomed to dealing in government bonds have found them an investment
of unusual risk. If an oﬃcer of a large bank is asked why he does not issue more bank
notes the reply will usually be that he does not want to risk such a large percent of
the bank’s capital in government bonds. (Bell 1912, p. 51)
Bell points to speciﬁc instances of dramatic changes in U.S. government bond
prices during the period of the National Banking System. W.C. Mitchell also em-
phasized the instability of prices for eligible bonds in his 1911 study of yields on
railroad and government bonds: “Instead of providing the stablest [sic] of American
securities from the investors’ point of view, government bonds have proved to be the
least stable among the bonds for which yields have been computed.” (Mitchell 1911,
p. 285) Further evidence to support this view comes from noting that many of the
largest national banks chose to hold only the minimum amount of government bonds
required by law to hold a national bank charter.
2.2 The opportunity cost of issuing national bank notes
James (1976) critiques the works of Goodhart and Cagan and presents an explanation
for the underissuance of national bank notes which hinges upon opportunity costs.
The analysis of James is partially based on observations made by the Indianapolis
Monetary Commission in 1898.14 James suggests that Goodhart’s argument that na-
tional banks underissued notes on account of risk associated with political opposition
to the system “is limited to the period 1907–1913 and has little relevance to the ques-
tion of low note issue in the 1890s; moreover, it is not an operational hypothesis.”
(James 1976, p. 360)
James asks, “If note issue was so risky after 1908, then why did the proportion
of notes outstanding remain so high?” James refers to the diﬀerential costs argument
14See Taylor (1898) for a summary of the ﬁndings of the Indianapolis Monetary Commission.
22which Goodhart proposed as a possible answer to this question. Again, Goodhart
claims that country banks could avoid part of the costs of redeeming national bank
notes by depositing the notes in a correspondent city bank. However, the city bank
at the end of this chain of bankers’ balances had no such option. If the city bank
chose to redeem the notes, it would forego the interest on these funds during the
period between shipping the redundant notes and receiving the lawful money from
the redemption funds.
As we suggested earlier, James shows through an example that this foregone
interest could not have been signiﬁcant and “is a triﬂing one to explain the change
in country and city bank issue of notes.” James also points out that Goodhart’s
diﬀerential cost argument is not substantiated empirically; the data does not appear
to support it over certain time periods. However, even if one accepts the statement
made by James that the diﬀerence in costs facing city versus country banks could
not have been too signiﬁcant, this is not to say that the costs associated with the
redemption procedure that faced each individual bank were inconsequential. An
individual bank, when deciding whether to issue additional circulation, could not be
certain that the public would absorb the notes. This aﬀected the actual costs and,
hence, proﬁtability of issuing notes. Again, this matter and its implications will be
discussed in a more satisfactory manner in the following sections.
After presenting a critique of Goodhart’s analysis, James presents his own ar-
gument to explain the underissuance of national bank notes. James suggests that
underissuance was caused “by the high opportunity costs of note issue in the form of
[high] local loan rates in southern and western states.” James argues that in areas in
which local loan rates were relatively high, issuing notes would imply foregoing the
high interest on the diﬀerence between the purchase price of the bond used as backing
and the amount of notes that could be issued (this diﬀerence is merely p−αmin(p,1)
23in Cagan’s proﬁt rate formula, equation 1). James backs up his argument by demon-
strating that the data tends to show a lower willingness for banks located in southern
and western states to issue notes and that the local loan rates were indeed higher in
these areas.
2.3 Redemption costs
Goodhart (1965) emphasized that variable redemption costs might be an important
aspect ignored by previous authors attempting to explain the national bank note
puzzle. Two papers have emphasized the importance of redemption costs in explaining
national bank behavior during this era.
Champ, Wallace, and Weber (1994) provide a possible reason to doubt some of
the assumptions behind prior calculations of the proﬁtability of national bank note
issue. Prior descriptions of the period claim that the nonbank public viewed national
bank notes and lawful money as perfect substitutes.15 Champ, Wallace, and Weber
refer to this notion as the “equivalence view” and discuss its implications. Because
of their reliance on the equivalence view, prior studies implied that a national bank
“could always get its own notes into circulation and, in eﬀect, keep them outstanding.”
(Champ, Wallace, and Weber 1994, p. 344) However, they show that the equivalence
view must be rejected.
Champ, Wallace, and Weber set up a model of note issuance in which the as-
sumption of perfect substitutability is maintained. They demonstrate that if the
collateral constraint on note issue was not binding (which, as noted previously, it was
not during the period of the National Banking System), then yields on the collateral
(government bonds) should have been equal to the tax rate on note issue (1% before
1900; eﬀectively, 1
2% thereafter). This, in turn, would imply that during this period
15See, for example, Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 21).
24the price of government bonds of a given class should have been ﬁxed, independent
of Treasury debt policies. Furthermore, Champ, Wallace, and Weber show that non-
bindingness of the collateral constraint also implies safe short-term rates should have
been pegged at the tax rate.
However, the data appear inconsistent with these implications. Yields on govern-
ment bonds thoughout the national banking era were 100 to 200 basis points above
the tax rate (see Figure 4). Furthermore, short-term interest rates were consider-
ably above the tax rate and were highly variable. Of course, the short-term assets
for which we have interest rate observations (call loans, for example) were not safe
assets—they possessed some degree of default risk. However, it is diﬃcult to believe
that the extreme variability in the observed call loan rate can be completely explained
by changes in default risk. In addition, the tax rate on note issue eﬀectively declines
from 1% to 1/2% in 1900. We would expect a similar decline in the average level of
call loan rates and government bond yields, but this is not borne out in the data.
These patterns of interest rates call into question the assumption that national bank
notes and lawful money were perfect substitutes, a key assumption behind many prior
studies.
Champ, Wallace, and Weber (1994) suggest an alternative explanation for the
national bank puzzle that hinges on redemption costs. In their view, national bank
notes did not work as well for some purposes as for others. Since the costs of redeeming
national bank notes were borne by the issuing bank, a bank would be concerned about
how quickly its notes would be redeemed. Notes issued to buy securities in organized
markets (the exact markets for which we have the high interest rate observations)
probably would be quickly deposited in a bank and sent through the redemption
process since national bank notes did not count as reserves for national banks. Hence,
it is possible that, although a high rate of interest could earned, it would only for a
25short period of time, and the redemption costs would outweigh the earned interest.
So national banks would not be able to arbitrage away the diﬀerential between the
interest rate on securities and the cost of issuing notes.
National banks would be more willing to issue notes in, say, a rural area where
the notes might stay in circulation for a long period of time before being redeemed.
Evidence will be given to support this assertion. As noted earlier, this is consistent
with the signiﬁcant number of large New York City banks that chose not to issue
notes. The “ﬂoat” on notes issued by them would be so short as to not be proﬁtable.
They turned to other operations (like being big players in the payments system) for
proﬁts. This view is made explicitly in a model by Wallace and Zhu (2007).
Champ, Freeman, and Weber (1999) provide a model that explicitly incorporates
costly bank note redemptions. They begin with a presentation of the national bank
note puzzle, noting the signiﬁcant spread between government bond yields and the
tax rate on notes issue as well as the signiﬁcant seasonal variability of short-term
interest rates. Champ, Freeman, and Weber note that the costs of intermediating
eligible government bonds into bank notes included the tax on circulation, record-
keeping, and security. They show that these costs alone “do not alone appear to be
large enough to fully account for the spread between government bond yields and
the tax rate on circulation. Nor were such costs likely to have varied seasonally.”
(Champ, Freeman, and Weber 1999, p. 569)
Champ, Freeman, and Weber develop an overlapping generations model in which
households are subject to a preference shock by which they wish to consume the goods
of another island other than the one on which they were born. To do so requires travel
to the other island when old. A household born on island i wants to consume goods
in period t from its home island with probability 1 − ωi
t and travels with probability
ωi
t. Banks in the model oﬀer deposits and issue bank notes. Deposits cannot be
26used to purchase goods on another island due to limited information; only bank notes
can be used. This is an attempt to mimic the observation that during the national
banking era, individual bank deposits typically were not used to make long-distance
transactions. Bank notes in circulation are taxed and may be redeemed through a
government-operated clearinghouse, the costs of which are charged back to the issuing
bank. Bank notes are backed by government-issued debt.
In the most general version of the model there are seasonal ﬂuctuations in the





ωH in periods t = J,2J,3J,...
ωL in all other periods
, (9)
where ωH > ωL. The periods where ω is large represent periods of high currency
demand. These periods correspond to the planting and harvesting seasons of the
national banking era.
They demonstrate that the nominal interest rate (Rt) on government bonds in
periods of high currency demand (harvest periods) is equal to




and is Rt = φ in nonharvest periods. Here φ is the tax on a dollar’s worth of notes
outstanding at the end of the period, θ is the redemption cost per dollar of a bank’s
redeemed notes, and πt+1 is the fraction of outstanding notes that are redeemed in
period t + 1.
The term φπt+1 represents the expected redemption costs per dollar of notes issued.
We see that πt+1, the probability of redemption, depends on household preferences
to go to other islands. If banks did not bear the cost of redemption, the nominal
27interest rate on eligible collateral would be constant.
The model of Champ, Freeman, and Weber delivers a nominal interest rate that
is higher than the tax rate on bank note circulation and that ﬂuctuate on a seasonal
basis. But how well does the model ﬁt the data? Using data from the U.S. Treasury
on the volume of bank note redemptions and the costs of redemption, they ﬁnd that
government bond yields are above the expected note issue costs (φ + θπ in their
model) by between 24 and 143 basis points during the period.16 They conclude that
“expected redemption costs, as computed with Redemption Agency data, do not
explain much of the observed yields on government bonds.” (Champ, Freeman, and
Weber 1999, p. 582) So what are they missing? If their model is correct, either the
redemption probabilities are too low or the costs associated with redemption are too
low or both.
Champ, Freeman, and Weber claim that their estimates of the probability of re-
demption are likely to be too low. They only count redemptions that go through
the oﬃcial redemption process. Over-the-counter redemptions as well as redemptions
directly between banks or through correspondent banks are not included and un-
doubtedly were costly. However, there is no reliable data on such redemptions. They
therefore look at other note issuing regimes to estimate redemption probabilities.
They then ask: What redemption rate (π) would be suﬃcient to explain the
diﬀerence between the costs of intermediation and the yield on government bonds.
They ﬁnd that a redemption rate of seven times per year would be suﬃcient. Such a
redemption rate is higher than that observed for Federal Reserve notes but is much
smaller than that observed in the Suﬀolk Banking System (1826–1858). They argue
that an average redemption rate of seven times per year is not unreasonable given
16Besides the tax rate on note issue and expected redemption costs, Champ, Freeman, and Weber
add in some costs of record-keeping costs to obtain their total costs of note issue. See Champ,
Freeman, and Weber (1999, p. 582) for details.
28the structure of the National Banking System.
3 Other Puzzles from the National Banking Era
The puzzling patterns of interest rates during the national banking era have received
a great deal of attention in the literature. However, there are other aspects of the
data of this era that are equally puzzling.
3.1 Inelasticity of national bank note issuance
The most common complaint voiced during the National Banking System concerned
an inelasticity of the currency.17 In fact, reference to many undergraduate textbooks
on money and banking which discusses the National Banking System will point to this
as one of the major defects of the System. The concern with this defect was one of the
main factors which provoked passage of the Federal Reserve Act, a major purpose
of which was “to provide a more elastic currency.” What was meant by currency
inelasticity and why did complaints regarding it exist? Furthermore, how can we
account for these complaints?
The complaints regarding currency inelasticity came in two basic forms. One of
these forms referred to bank notes which were backed by a ﬁxed supply of bonds
as being inherently inelastic.18 This type of complaint was apparently based on the
premise that the aggregate quantity of notes that could be issued was ultimately
limited by the amount of bonds which were eligible as backing. This, undoubtedly,
could have been a problem if banks were fully intermediating all the eligible bonds.
However, as noted before, this was never the case during the period under study. This
17Friedman and Schwartz discuss the issue of currency inelasticity. See Friedman and
Schwartz (1963, pp. 168–70).
18This criticism of the National Banking System remains to this day. See, for example,
Meltzer (2002).
29is particularly true before 1900, when banks only held 20 to 30 percent of the eligible
bonds. Thus, this form of the complaint was merely hypothetical; it referred to a
possible problem related to note issue backed by bonds but not to a problem which
actually existed during the period.
But there is another sense in which critics viewed bank note issue as inelastic.
This complaint regarded a view that bank note issuance did not expand and contract
with “the needs of trade.” As Kemmerer stated in his National Monetary Commission
study of the period,
The most common criticism of our American currency system is its alleged inelasticity
or irresponsiveness to trade demands, this inelasticity is sometimes considered with
particular reference to panic periods which occur at more or less irregular and widely
separated times, and sometimes with particular reference to regularly recurring sea-
sonal ﬂuctuations in the demand for money and loanable capital. (Kemmerer 1910,
p. 13)19
Laughlin, a frequent contemporary critic of the National Banking System, also
expressed concern about currency elasticity:
It is one of the most severe criticisms upon the national banking system at the present
time that these notes displace gold, are expensive, fail to respond to the needs of the
community, and are inelastic often contracting when they are needed and expanding
when they are not needed. The notes system has been one of the points at which the
National Bank Act has been most severely criticised.... (Laughlin 1912, p. 6)
The presumption of currency inelasticity has been used to explain many of the fea-
tures of the data during this period. Champ, Smith, and Williamson (1996) present a
model in which seasonal ﬂuctuations in credit and liquidity demand, coupled with an
19Kemmerer also provided measures of the elasticity of the various components of the money
stock. As a humorous side note, Kemmerer found that national bank notes
Do not appear to exhibit any considerable seasonal elasticity, i.e., rise and fall according
to the seasonal variations in demands of trade.... There is no evidence of contraction
when the crop-moving demands are over, the national bank-note elasticity being (to use
a rather inelegant expression) of the chewing-gum variety.
See Kemmerer (1910, p. 153).
30inelastic system of bank note issuance, lead to seasonal movements in interest rates
and banking panics. An elastic currency regime, meant to mimic the Canadian bank
note regime during the late 1800s, does not display these seasonal movements and
operates without banking panics. However, as Champ, Freeman, and Weber (1999)
note, currency inelasticity may be able to explain the period’s interest rate ﬂuc-
tuations dues to unexpected changes in liquidity demand, it “cannot explain why
there were persistent seasonal movements in interest rates” that arose from the “pre-
dictable seasonal movements in currency demand.” (Champ, Freeman, and Weber
1999, p. 573) Banks could have costlessly held a stock of idle notes in its vaults in
anticipation of the predictable seasonal demands.20
Regardless of whether currency elasticity can explain the observed patterns in
interest rates, it is not strongly debated that aggregate bank note circulation was rel-
atively inelastic during this period. Inelasticity of currency is diﬃcult to understand
given that national banks were not fully intermediating the eligible bonds. Further-
more, it would, at ﬁrst glance, appear that incentives existed for the issuance of notes
to expand and contract as needed. As Cagan states, “When money tightened and in-
terest rates rose, the price of U.S. bonds tended to decline.... When money eased, the
opposite occurred.” (Cagan 1965, p. 91) In Cagan’s view, declining prices of govern-
ment bonds (rising interest rates) should have increased the proﬁtability of bank note
issuance and, hence, should have elicited greater circulation. The opposite should
have occurred when bonds prices rose. These incentives seem to work in the right
direction for providing an elastic currency. What caused the observed inelasticity?
Champ, Wallace, and Weber (1994) and Champ, Freeman, and Weber (1999)
provide a possible explanation for currency inelasticity. Issuing notes to provide for
a short-term liquidity need in certain locations simply may not have been proﬁtable.
20Recall that the tax on national bank notes only applied to notes in circulation.
31By deﬁnition, such notes likely would not have stayed in circulation for long before
being redeemed through the formal redemption process. If these notes did not stay
in circulation for a long enough period of time, the cost of redemption may oﬀset any
interest earned. Certainly, notes issued in money market centers probably would have
been redeemed in short order. Champ, Freeman, and Weber (1999) show that costly
bank note redemptions can lead to lower currency elasticity and greater volatility of
nominal interest rates.
Another possible explanation for the observed currency inelasticity is the follow-
ing. Due to the risk features of note issue detailed previously in this paper and the
long-term nature of eligible bonds, banks may not have perceived the eligible bonds
as perfect substitutes for private short-term securities. So, even though banks were
not issuing notes up to the legal maximum, the restriction on the particular class of
security which could be intermediated may have been binding. Once it is granted
that these two classes of securities, long-term U.S. bonds versus short-term private
securities, were not perfect substitutes, it would not be paradoxical to observe under-
issuance and complaints over currency inelasticity.
If the National Banking Act had allowed the use of securities such as the modern-
day Treasury bill or private short-term securities as backing for notes, it would be
diﬃcult to make this argument. In fact, the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908 did allow
the use of commercial paper as the basis for the issuance of an “emergency currency”
during periods of ﬁnancial crises. The consequences of this bill’s relaxation of the
legal restrictions on the type of debt that could be intermediated were tested only
once at the outbreak of World War I. However, it appears that the act worked well
in adding an elasticity to the supply of notes.
As Friedman and Schwartz state, “To judge by that one episode, the Aldrich-
Vreeland Act provided an eﬀective device for solving a threatened interconvertibility
32crisis without monetary contraction or widespread bank failures.” (Friedman and
Schwartz 1963, p. 172) This lends support to the view that currency inelasticity
was caused by a bindingness of legal restrictions on the type of debt that could
be intermediated into notes. Once this restriction was relaxed, bank note issuance
appears to have responded well during a period of ﬁnancial crisis.
We can also point to certain legal restrictions which interfered with the ability of
national banks to adjust the amount of outstanding bank notes. Banks were restricted
by law as to the aggregate amount of notes that could be retired in a given month.
Further, any bank which reduced its circulation could not subsequently increase its
circulation for a period of six months. In addition, Friedman and Schwartz (1963,
p. 169), as well as Bell (1912), refer to the existence of signiﬁcant delays between a
bank’s decision to issue additional currency and actually receiving the notes from the
Comptroller of the Currency. However, given that national banks could costlessly
keep a stock of their own bank notes idle in their vaults, delays in obtaining new
notes does not seem to adequately provide an explanation for currency elasticity. A
bank did not have to wait for new notes to be printed to put notes into circulation.
Furthermore, most of the observations about currency inelasticity had to do with
aggregate national bank note circulation. Disaggregated measures of bank note cir-
culation display a greater degree of elasticity.
3.2 Low note issuance during the 1880s
We have noted that throughout most of the national banking era, note issue was
below the maximum allowable by law. The period of the 1880s is particularly puz-
zling. As we see in Figure 6, national bank note circulation falls by nearly 50%.
Cagan (1963, 1965) suggests that the decline during the 1880s was caused by lower
proﬁtability of note issue during that period. In the early 1880s, the federal govern-
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ment began to run budgetary surpluses. This led to a retirement of nearly two-thirds
of the government debt from 1879 to 1891. Associated with this were farily sub-
stantial increases in government bond prices during the 1880s. As is obvious from
Cagan’s proﬁt rate formula, equation 1, increases in government bond prices lead to
lower proﬁt rates on national bank note issue. In Cagan’s view, banks responded by
cutting back on note issue.
Champ and Thomson (2006) provide additional insights into the particularly low
issuance of the 1880s. They claim that at least part of the decline in note issue
during that period was demand-driven. Though a series of laws, Congress introduced
an alternative of currency that was superior to national bank notes in many respects.
That alternative currency came in the form of silver certiﬁcates.
34Silver certiﬁcates had numerous advantages over national bank notes. They sat-
isﬁed legal reserve requirements against deposits for national banks; national bank
notes did not. Silver certiﬁcates could also be used to pay customs duties whereas
bank notes did not qualify for that use. Silver certiﬁcates also had a denominational
advantage. By the early 1880s, most low-denomination (ones and twos) national bank
notes had been withdrawn from circulation. Beginning in 1886, silver certiﬁcates were
issued in one- and two-dollar denominations.
Champ and Thomson suggest that these factors caused a substitution of silver
certiﬁcates for national bank notes during the 1880s and early 1890s. Figure 7 il-
lustrates the circulation of these two currencies. This ﬁgure also points out when
important legislation related to silver certiﬁcates was passed.
From the peak of bank note issue in 1882 to the trough in 1891, national bank
note issue fell by over $190 million. During the same time period, silver certiﬁcate
issuance rose by over $248 million, with a signiﬁcant fraction of that increase being in
lower denominations. In 1891, over 15% of the silver certiﬁcates in circulation were
in one- and two-dollar denominations.
Figure 7 also illustrates the sum of national bank note and silver certiﬁcate circu-
lation (the black line). This clearly illustrates that the sum of the two types of notes
grows at a smooth rate during the 1880s as silver certiﬁcates supplant national bank
notes.
4 Conclusion
As we have seen in this paper, the national banking era is a period of puzzles. This
paper has provided a summary of the myriad of puzzles present in the era and has

























Figure 7: National Bank Notes and Silver Certiﬁcates in Circulation,
1867–1909 (millions of dollars)
Proﬁt rate calculations by Phillip Cagan and other authors indicate that, at times,
the proiﬁt rate on national bank note issue was far in excess of alternative uses of
bank capital. In light of this, it is puzzling why national banks never fully exploited
their note-issuing capabilities. These proﬁt rate calculations have come under some
criticism, primarily due to their assumption that the banks could always keep their
notes in circulation and therefore earn interest on their issue. The presence of periods
in which banks had large amounts of idle notes in their vaults causes prior proﬁt
calculations to be overstated.
Related to the low note issuance puzzle is the confounding behavior of interest
36rates. Given the system of note issue, one would have expected banks to issue notes
up to the point at which the yield on eligible collateral was equal to the tax rate on
note issue. That was never the case during the period. Yields on government bonds
were 100 to 200 basis points above the tax period throughout the era. Short-term
interest rates were high and rose signiﬁcantly during the spring planting season and
fall harvest season. It is puzzling why banks did not exploit these high interest rates
by issuing more notes to buy securities in these markets.
Some authors have suggested that certain risk features associated with the issuance
of national bank notes may help to explain the national bank note puzzle. National
banks faced the risk that their note-issuing powers could be eliminated by Congress.
If this had occurred, the bonds banks held by national banks may have fallen in value.
This would have implied potentially large capital losses for national banks. Another
risk aspect of note issue came in the way of the eligible backing for national bank
notes. Only long-term government bonds qualiﬁed. It has been well documented
that these bonds experienced fairly dramatic price swings during the period, causing
market risk for national banks.
Costly bank note redemptions provides another potential explanation for the na-
tional bank note puzzle. The issuing bank paid the costs of redemption during this
period. Therefore, an issuing bank had to be concerned that it would have to redeem
its notes and incur the costs. Using national bank notes to make purchases in orga-
nized securities markets may very well have led to prompt note redemption. In this
case, the interest earned over a short period of time may have been more than oﬀset
by redemption costs. Banks undoubtedly considered this aspect in choosing whether
to issue notes.
Another puzzle of the national banking era is the inelasticity of bank note issue.
Aggregate note issue shows little variability, despite signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in cur-
37rency demand over the seasons. Currency elasticity is puzzling since the colleteral
constraint on note issue was not binding during the period, The presence of cur-
rency elasticity has been used to explain interest rate behavior during the period.
Costly bank note redemptions may provide an explanation for currency elasticity.
Notes issued to satisfy short-term liquidity needs probably would have been redeemed
promptly, imposing costs on the issuing banks. These costs may have outweighed the
beneﬁts.
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